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Abstract 
All local transport authorities in England have, since 2000, been obliged to submit 
five year plans for local transport. The plans set out the overall strategy, key 
policies that will be implemented and how the strategy will be resourced. The 
central government now adjusts the funding allocations up or down by up to 25% 
based on the quality of the plans and, on an on-going basis, achievement against 
the targets proposed in these plans. This paper presents a theoretical and practical 
assessment of the impacts of these incentives on local authority performance. 
 
The research has employed a mixed methods approach with interviews, 
questionnaires, the development of a game theoretic representation of the process 
and a laboratory experiment. The findings have been discussed with practitioners. 
The research suggests that the presence of performance rewards, in a scheme 
where authorities believe they have a reasonable chance of being rewarded, leads 
to authorities setting more ambitious targets. Whilst it is not certain that these 
targets will be met it appears that the absolute outcomes achieved are likely to be 
better than they otherwise would have been. Generic conclusions are drawn about 
the conditions under which target-based performance reward schemes will work 
best. 
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1. Introduction 
Targets set out the level of performance that an organization aims to achieve for a 
particular activity within a given timeframe. This might be for example a 
commitment to reduce fatalities on urban roads by 10% over the next five years. 
Managing public services through the use of targets is not new (Hood, 2006). It is 
however, becoming increasingly widespread globally (FHWA, 2004; Moynihan, 
2006; Hodgson et al., 2007 and Tuominen and Himanen, 2008) and in the field of 
transport. The US federal government, for example, is currently considering linking 
funding for new infrastructure to state level performance measures. A key difficulty 
with such a proposal is “developing effective performance measurements without 
negative unintended consequences” (NTPP, 2008, p6). A recent review of the use 
of targets in transport found that “there is little published evidence on the effect of 
targets on the performance of the transport sector.” (Marsden and Bonsall, 2006, 
p191). This paper adds to the knowledge base and, whilst based around a case 
study in England, many aspects of the findings have broader applicability. 
 
Since 2000, the Department for Transport (DfT) has required local authorities in 
England to prepare 5 year „Local Transport Plans‟ (LTPs) in which local authorities 
set out the policies and expenditure required to make the integrated transport 
vision a reality (Kelly et al., 2006). The LTPs were required to contain targets for 
progress against which the plans would be assessed. This process has evolved 
into one in which authorities are ranked and rewarded according to their 
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performance. The most recent round of LTP (LTP2) forms the case study for this 
paper. 
 
For LTP2 each authority is given an initial funding allocation for integrated transport 
measures for the period 2006/07 to 2010/11 using a formula allocation mechanism. 
The formula was developed based on four agreed priorities (congestion, 
accessibility, air quality and safety) and adapted on a needs basis (e.g. 20% of the 
total funding allocated is based on the road casualty figures for 1994 – 1998 (DfT, 
2005)). The funding allocation was to be varied up or down by up to 25% based on 
the quality of the LTP2 plan, past evidence of delivery, the ambition of the targets 
set and, over time, achievement against these targets (see DfT, 2004 for full 
details).  
 
The goal of central government in developing this system appears to be a desire to 
reward those authorities that appear to deliver results most cost effectively. It also 
has aspirations to raise the quality of planning and, through some form of 
competition, increase the net outcomes of its spending. Critics suggest that such 
processes are limiting in several ways. They may for example focus behaviours 
only around those aspects that can be measured, can encourage short-term 
decision making and create perverse incentives (Smith, 1995 and Hood, 2006). 
 
A mixed-methods approach was adopted for the research to identify the likely 
outcomes of a performance-led rewards scheme in local transport planning.  To 
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assess the underlying theoretical expectations of the funding competition a game-
theoretical framework was established. Game theory can provide insights into the 
key drivers of outcomes in a situation where players interact. To enable a 
meaningful game to be constructed an initial investigation of the details of the 
performance regime and how local authorities were approaching the target setting 
task was therefore undertaken using interviews and a postal survey and this is 
described in Section 2. Section 3 provides an outline of the game theoretic model 
and its key findings. Finally, a laboratory experiment was designed to test the 
hypotheses generated by the game theory and evidential work and this is 
described and presented in Section 4. Implications of the combined findings and 
some conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. The Local Transport Plan Game in Practice 
Two key features of the LTP2 funding process were that: 
1. The DfT stated that in total no extra funds would be available for 
performance (a zero sum game). The implication of this was that there 
would be both winners and losers and this could affect what was delivered 
in any authority. 
2. Clear guidance was given on what had to be measured and how it would be 
assessed. 15 mandatory indicators were identified1 (Table 1) and a 
maximum of 40 indicators was recommended (DfT, 2004). Thresholds which 
                                                 
1
 Some authorities were exempt from the air quality and congestion indicators 
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would denote satisfactory and stretching2 performance were to be published 
for the 15 mandatory indicators3 with assessment of the ambition of local 
indicators to be made on a case by case basis for which the authorities were 
to provide supporting evidence. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The DfT had therefore established a system whereby the local authorities bid 
against each other for performance reward based on the targets they set and the 
apparent (and then actual) ability to deliver them. The key guidance given to local 
authorities relating to how they would be assessed was that targets should be 
based on outcomes (i.e. authorities were competing on the number of fatalities 
they reduce not the amount spent on casualty reduction schemes) and that targets 
should be “challenging but realistic” (DfT, 2004, p6). 
 
To obtain an in-depth understanding of how local authorities were approaching 
target setting, interviews were conducted with a range of people from six 
authorities involved in LTP2 submission. This varied from those responsible for 
individual targets, heads of LTP, regional government officers, and consultants to 
those with political control (e.g. councillors).  These interviews were used to help 
provide a perspective on the process of LTP2 target setting and to develop the 
                                                 
2
 For example, a satisfactory target level for slight casualties was defined as no change over recent 
levels whilst a stretching target was defined as a 10% reduction over recent levels. 
3
 Uniform national thresholds for stretching and satisfactory performance only proved possible to set 
for 10 indicators due to the large variation in local circumstances 
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questionnaire that was sent, in March 2006, to all 82 LTP submitting authorities 
investigating how they chose their targets for LTP2. 31 of the 82 authorities 
responded (a 38% response rate) and analysis suggests that no particular type of 
authority was under-represented in the sample. The responses from the 
questionnaire were subsequently compared with how the submitted targets had 
actually been assessed by the DfT (DfT, 2006).  
 
96% of authorities agreed with the statement that they were more likely to 
increase/maintain their future funding levels if they achieved the targets they had 
set.  In addition 60% agreed that if they did not receive their full allocation of 
funding (100% formula) that they would not be able to achieve their targets in 
2010/11. Authorities were therefore aware that they needed to set targets that they 
could meet, as this would impact on their funding levels.   
 
The interpretation of challenging was more varied across authorities. Authorities 
were asked to rate the likelihood of meeting the targets they had set. The average 
values for all authorities are shown in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Across all authorities the average expectation of meeting the targets is 70 to 80% 
suggesting that authorities are indeed challenging themselves and taking some 
risks. Interestingly, with the exception of Killed and Serious Injury accidents (where 
 8 
the differences are small), authorities are more certain of achieving targets which 
are assessed as stretching. This is indicative of authorities playing strategies 
where they set stretching targets in areas they know they will perform better in. 
 
Authorities were asked to make an assessment of how they thought the DfT would 
assess their targets and how they would assess their own targets for the 
mandatory indicators. The authorities were marked with a 2 if they set (or were 
assessed as having) stretching targets and 1 if they were not stretching. A 
comparison of the forecast and actual assessments (DfT, 2006a; DfT, 2006b) is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
It is clear that the local authorities took a pessimistic view of how they would be 
assessed by the DfT. This suggests that during the LTP2 process, local authorities 
felt some pressure to be ambitious with their targets, an important goal of the 
performance regime.  The actual assessments are more closely in line with the 
authorities‟ own perceptions of the degree of stretch that the targets represented, 
given their local circumstances. This implies that the DfT has had some success in 
establishing a level playing field where it assesses each target on its merit and not 
just according to national rules. Whilst these findings hold true at an aggregate 
level statistical tests of differences in assessments between the DfT and authorities 
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were conducted for three main groupings of authorities (metropolitan areas4, 
smaller urban authorities and rural authorities).  Significant differences exist in 
assessments on bus patronage for urban and rural authorities. Urban authorities 
differ from the DfT on the numbers of killed and seriously injured accidents whilst 
rural authorities also differed from DfT for footway condition, unclassified road 
condition and slight accidents (Kelly et al., 2008). This suggests that it might be 
easier to establish a level playing field for assessment for some indicators than 
others. 
 
Only 16% of the authorities responding to the questionnaire stated that they were 
clear about how the DfT assessment would work. The interview evidence showed 
that whilst the scope of the assessment was clear5 and the need to set and deliver 
“challenging but realistic” targets was understood, the exact process by which their 
LTP submission would be turned into a performance reward was not fully revealed 
to the local authorities in advance. From DfT‟s point of view, this decision not to 
reveal the full details of the assessment process could be rationalised in at least 
three ways: 
 to avoid creating perverse incentives for authorities to focus on narrow, pre-
specified indicators; 
 to allow DfT the flexibility to judge local targets in relation to local 
conditions, including an element of subjective judgement; 
                                                 
4
 There are six areas classified as metropolitan in the UK (outside London) and this is too small a sample for 
the tests to be reliable so the contrasts in this section are reported for smaller urban and rural authorities. 
5
 i.e. the set of assessment criteria, although not the details of how those criteria would be scored and 
weighted. 
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 furthermore, if the overall budget was indeed a fixed sum then it is possible 
to state in advance the relationship between performance and assessment, 
but not the relationship between performance and reward. 
 
A small number of examples were found of authorities failing to set “challenging but 
realistic” targets. For example, some authorities chose to set targets for 0% growth 
in bus patronage even where the evidence suggested that a decline was the best 
achievable. This may have been due to the local political implications of „aiming for 
decline‟ or due to fear of the potential funding implications. E.g. “targets were set to 
at least meet the minimum criteria of the LTP guidance even if this seemed 
ambitious” (LTP officer). Cases such as this were the exception rather than the 
rule. 
 
We conclude that, overall, the authorities were actively engaged in setting 
challenging but realistic targets. They understood the relative difficulty of meeting 
targets in different policy areas and carefully chose the amount of stretch they put 
into their plans accordingly. The funding reward was important to them for delivery, 
but they could not be confident in advance what reward would follow from a given 
set of targets. 
 
The integrated transport settlements for 2006 to 2007 and their adjustments for the 
best and worst performing authorities are shown in Table 3. The table shows that 
the system allows small authorities as well as larger authorities to perform well and 
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that predominantly urban, rural and authorities with a mix of both characteristics 
can also perform well. This implies that there is a level playing field for authorities 
to compete in the process. Whilst the four worst performing authorities are all 
comparatively small, a regression of funding adjustment against initial funding 
allocation finds no relationship between the two (R2 = 0.039) which again suggests 
that the process does not reward bigger authorities (those receiving more money) 
nor penalize small authorities (those receiving less). 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
3. The Theoretical Local Transport Plan Game 
To inform our understanding of the likely impacts of the performance reward 
scheme for LTP2 a theoretical model was developed. Game theory was originally 
devised to study strategic interactions between players whose actions impinge on 
each other (Dutta, 2000) and is a “core approach to the analysis of institutional 
relationships” (De Palma and Lindsey, 2003, p1). Here, game theory was used to 
define a model of the relationships between DfT and the local authority players, 
and to generate hypotheses for testing using the laboratory experiment. The key 
characteristics of the game are presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.6 and the model 
results in 3.7. The characteristics are derived from the work described in Section 2. 
A more extensive description can be found in Nellthorp and Marsden (2009).  
 
3.1 Set of players 
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The key players of the game are: 
• DfT 
• 82 Local Transport Plan authorities. 
 
This simplifies the real game by excluding third parties such as bus companies and 
the regional tier of government, which provide important parts of the context for 
target setting, but do not themselves either set the targets (local authorities‟ role) or 
determine the assessment criteria and funding (DfT‟s role).     
 
3.2 Motivations of the players 
The motivations of the DfT were highlighted in Section 2 as getting better use of 
resources and encouraging better planning. The interviews indicated that the local 
transport authorities‟ main motivation in the LTP process is to maximise funding. 
Whilst their transport strategies as a whole serve wider goals, the LTP process 
offers the prospect of greater resources to support their strategies. The key trade 
off, therefore, that local authorities have to make is how much extra effort to put in 
compared with the expected reward they would receive. Under the current rules, if 
no additional effort is put in and a very poor LTP is produced, authorities would still 
receive 75% of their indicative funding allocation. 
 
For the theoretical model, therefore, the local authority players are assumed to 
maximise 
  )( ii zcVEMax   (1) 
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where: 
E(Vi) is the expected financial reward to authority i, in the form of 
performance funding; 
c(zi) is the cost of playing the game (at effort level zi). 
 
 
3.3 Set of actions the players can take 
Two simplified measures of the extent to which authorities are competing are: 
 planned stretch – the level of ambition of the targets (at the time of target 
setting); 
 achievement – recent progress towards the targets that are in place.   
 
Correspondingly, each LTP authority has two sets of actions: 
 prepare the Local Transport Plan – including setting targets; 
 implement and report on the Local Transport Plan. 
 
The LTP authorities therefore have to make decisions about how ambitious to be 
for each indicator, which will be reflected in the strategies they choose to adopt. 
There was no evidence of opportunities for collusion and, whilst other funding 
opportunities exist, the LTP game was taken seriously and was important enough 
in its own right to be modeled as an independent system. 
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DfT‟s most important action within the game is to assess the plans and progress on 
delivery and allocate a fixed block of funding between the 82 LTP authorities, 
annually.  
 
3.4 Payoffs 
The payoffs to the LTP authorities will be their additional funding net of the cost of 
effort exerted (equation (1) above). Initially DfT indicated the range of additional 
funding would be +25% to -25% compared with the nominal, formulaic funding 
guideline (see Section 1). In fact nothing lower than -12.5% was awarded. The 
payoff to DfT, aside from the financial loss and effort in adminstering the process, 
is the gain in useful outcomes on the part of the local authorities – discussed 
above.  
 
3.5 Sequence 
The time sequence of the game is unusual, compared with others in the literature, 
in being in two distinct stages: each player plans their action first – and has that 
assessed by DfT – before going on to implement their action and be assessed on 
that as well.  Consideration was given to a two-stage theoretical game, although it 
was concluded that this would complicate the analysis for no gain in predictive 
power. The interviews confirmed that the authorities also view each five year LTP 
as something closer to a one-shot game, subject to some adjustments during the 
implementation period.  
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3.6 Information 
The key characteristic here is the one already discussed – that the authorities were 
given incomplete information about the way they would be assessed.  This is 
reflected in basic mathematical structure of the game (below) where the reward is 
probabilistic, rather than a certainty based on certain performance.  
 
Players were able to see each others‟ targets from the first LTP period and some 
informal benchmarking networks exist for performance comparison. However, 
target setting was conducted independently and the authorities did not have the 
opportunity to see the others‟ final targets before deciding their own.    
 
3.7 Theoretical Model 
A wide range of game theoretic models were considered, before settling on the 
rent seeking contest (Tullock, 1980). In a simple rent seeking contest with two 
players, i and j, and two prizes – one high (e.g. +25% in the LTP game) and one 
low (e.g. -25% in the LTP game), VH and VL, the game can be set up as follows. 
Player i‟s probability of winning over player j is given by the ratio of i‟s effort to total 
effort 
ji
i
i
zz
z
p

       (2) 
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…so if i‟s and j‟s efforts are equal, then i‟s probability to win the higher prize, VH, is 
equal to
2
1



. When i doubles her effort but the probability to win increases to 
only 
3
2
2
2



. 
The model has a random element (probability to win), but can be made more 
deterministic by applying a higher power to the effort terms in (2), e.g. zi
2, zj
2. 
 
The expected payoff for each player is their expected reward net of effort exerted 
(as in (1)). It is then necessary to find a Nash equilibrium solution – one that is 
optimal for each player given the behaviour of others. Adding additional players (up 
to 82 in total) and additional prizes increases the complexity of the game. 
Mathematical solutions are given in Nellthorp and Marsden (2009).  
 
The key results from the theoretical analysis are: 
1. The symmetric Nash equilibrium has a desirable property of maximising 
aggregate effort across the players. Achieving a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
requires a „level playing field‟ between the 82 local authorities, hence DfT‟s 
success (or otherwise) in taking account of any inherent advantages or 
disadvantages of particular authorities plays an important role in the game. 
2. Furthermore, DfT‟s use of assessment methods which are partly subjective 
gives them the flexibility to take these differences into account. 
3. The prize structure plays a critical role in determining the strength of the 
incentives. Reducing the number of prizes (with a fixed prize fund) tends to 
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increase the competitive force between the players, provided the principal can 
maintain the level playing field. This is manifested as greater total effort (see 
Figure 2), and hence – presumably – better transport outcomes. 
 
Figure 2 shows the sensitivity of effort exerted to a range of prize structures, 
varying both the number of prizes and the prize gradient (the ratio of the first 
prize, v1, to the k
th prize, vk). A prize fund of V = 100 is assumed. The dot 
indicates the prize structure in the local transport plan game as executed. 
 
Figure 2: Effort responses in the 82 player game 
 
Figure 2 suggests that the greatest effort will be exerted when a single prize is 
offered. However, if the designer choses to offer a large number of prizes, the 
prize gradient begins to play a major role.  For example, “when there are in 
excess of 60 prizes, moving from a prize gradient of 2 to a prize gradient of 10 
has the effect of roughly doubling the amount of effort exerted, for the same 
prize fund” (Ibid., p13). 
4. Additionally, if the number of prizes exceeds 0.63*N (the number of players) = 
52 in this case, then a symmetric Nash equilibrium may not be achievable.  
5. However, in a game with players of mixed ability (heterogeneous players), there 
may be compelling reasons for having a greater number of prizes. In particular, 
a weaker player needs to know that they have a realistic chance of winning at 
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least the lowest prize, if they are to have the incentive to compete (see 
Blavatsky, 2004; Symanski and Valletti, 2004).  
6. Optimal incentive design therefore relies on balancing these factors in a 
particular case. If we believed that DfT could successfully achieve a completely 
level playing field, it might be appropriate to recommend a „winner-takes-all‟ or 
Challenge Fund type arrangement with a single prize. Conversely, if it is judged 
that the „level playing field‟ is not sustainable, we might consider adding more 
prizes for „weak‟ performance, or we might consider breaking the contest down 
into several separate pools of more evenly-matched players. Nellthorp and 
Marsden (2009) found that the loss of incentive from splitting the contest 
appears to be small (~1%), and such action might be attractive if the costs of 
administering the current assessment system are high. 
 
Finally, the game theoretic model allows us to establish some testable hypotheses, 
which were taken forward to the experimental phase of the work (section 4): 
H1: The effort exerted by authorities when faced with performance incentives as in 
the LTP game will be greater than that without performance incentives; 
H2: Where the authorities are broadly homogeneous in their ability to compete for 
the prizes on offer, fewer prizes will encourage greater effort – for a given prize 
fund – than many prizes;  
H3: Conversely to H2, if authorities are heterogeneous in ability, more prizes are 
likely to stimulate greater effort than fewer. 
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4. The Experimental Assessment of the Local Transport Plan 
To help bridge the gap between the simplified approach of the theoretical model 
and the realities of decision-making in a real-world environment, an experimental 
approach to understanding the behaviour of local transport planners under 
incentives has been adopted. In particular, the laboratory experiment provides an 
opportunity to understand further the behavioural dynamics between competing 
players over the course of the game. 
 
4.1 Experimental Description 
A simulation of the Local Transport Plan system was developed. The experiment 
involved groups of players using the PLUTO land-use and transport software 
model (Bonsall, 1994). The model places the user in the role of the local authority 
with decision making powers on interventions commonly available to local 
authorities such as infrastructure investment and public transport subsidy. Targets 
are set for five years and policy and budgetary decisions conducted on an annual 
basis. The city is a stand-alone city with no transport interaction with adjacent 
cities. The software was modified to allow the research team to play the role of the 
DfT whilst players simultaneously play the role of the local authorities. 
 
The experiment placed eight groups of five players in the Local Transport Plan 
game environment each with an identical city. Within each group the five players 
were to compete against each other – each independently developing and 
submitting a plan with targets. Rewards and penalties were applied to the capital 
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funding settlement according to the experimental condition they faced and their 
ranking in the competition in terms of ambition of targets and achievement against 
targets. The eight groups were exposed to each of three different experimental 
scenarios in a random order: 
 E0 – no incentives ($10m per annum irrespective of performance) 
 E1 – one prize ($20m for best performer, default $7.5m funding for others) 
 E2 – multiple prizes ($12.5m, $11.25m, $10m, $8.75m, plus the $7.5m 
default). 
 
The hypotheses set out at the end of Section 3 are therefore tested as follows: 
H1: True if effort in E1 and E2 > E0 
H2: Effort in E1 > E2 if players are homogenous; 
H3: Effort in E2 > E1 if players are heterogeneous. 
 
One of the main limitations of the experimental approach is of replicating the 
motivations of the real game players (ecological validity). The use of LTP 
practitioners would clearly be preferable to reduce the impact of mismatched 
motivations of players. This was impractical however so undergraduate students 
from the faculties of engineering, mathematics, sciences, computing and 
environment with no previous experience of transport planning were used. A 
further challenge is the establishment of the relative capabilities of the players 
(homogeneity). The effect and implications of this are discussed in Section 4.2.  
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Pre-experimental familiarization with the software and the task was provided 
(Funke (2001)). For each experiment participants visited the computing laboratory 
for a maximum of three hours to set their targets (of which seven were required) for 
the experimental scenario they were presented with. The funding rules were 
signaled clearly to the players. A questionnaire on the effort exerted setting targets 
was completed using the NASA Task Load Index scales (Hart and Staveland, 
1998). They returned on a subsequent day to receive their initial settlement (based 
on target ambition) and then to play the five year strategy through the software 
simultaneously with the competing players. One hour was allowed for each 
simulated year of play which proved generous. The ranking of players was not 
announced in experimental scenario E0 until after year 5, was only indicated 
through the settlement to the best player in E1 and was presented to all players in 
E2 as this is implicit in the five settlements. Participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire on effort exerted during the task similar to the target setting exit 
questionnaire. They were also asked to complete a more detailed questionnaire on 
the whole experiment after the last session. 
 
Participants were paid a fee based on attendance, not performance. The decision 
not to offer a performance-based fee in the experiment mirrors the lack of a direct 
financial reward to LTP staff in the real game – even if their authorities gain 
financially. Although contentious, there is a literature which supports this approach 
(Wickham, 2007; Beattie and Loomes, 1997).  
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The key metric from the theoretical model is „effort‟. Funke (2001) suggests that 
both results and process oriented measures should be taken. Table 4 shows the 
measures adopted. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 
4.2 Experimental Validity 
We begin by assessing the external validity of the game through responses to the 
end of experiment questionnaire shown in Table 5. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
The results suggest that the experiment reproduced the key features of the LTP 
system. For example, participants understood the relationship between stretching 
targets, risk and performance rewards. The findings are less conclusive on 
performance penalties where it appears that the penalties did not have as large an 
impact on participants‟ ability to achieve their plans. This may be, as in the real 
game, due to the ability to offset losses through other measures (such as slightly 
increased parking fees). Encouragingly participants, on average, reported 
competing with each other, understood the software tool and did not appear to just 
put in effort at the start of the game. There was evidence that participants 
understood which indicators it was easiest to achieve stretching performance for 
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and could focus their efforts on those (as the interviews and questionnaire 
suggested happens in the real game). The motivations of the participants in 
respect of the key features of the game therefore map reasonably well to 
practitioners suggesting that the ecological validity is not substantially 
compromised. 
 
Despite the provision of a training day, there was very strong evidence of learning 
effects across the three experimental rounds which underlined the importance of 
randomized play. Figure 3 shows the results of planning time invested in the first, 
second and third rounds of play. Whilst the time spent setting targets for all 40 
players followed the order E1>E2>E0 the differences were not significant statistically 
and likely to be somewhat influenced by learning. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
Despite the selection of students in an attempt to attain homogenous players it 
appears that capabilities differed between players within groups and also between 
different groups. Figure 4 shows the target setting and performance over five years 
for two of the groups playing the same experimental scenario. 
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
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It can be seen that there is substantial variation between the target ambition set 
and achieved by some players in group X and little in group Y. This is found 
throughout the data set so there is heterogeneity to varying degrees in all groups. 
When asked in the exit questionnaire 30% of respondents agreed that their groups 
were homogenous and 30% disagreed. This is sufficiently large to limit the ability of 
the experimental findings to differentiate between hypotheses H2 and H3.  
 
4.3 Self-reported effort results 
Table 6 shows the effort committed by players in setting targets and playing the 
five year game across the three scenarios. There is no significant difference 
between the self-reported effort invested in target setting across the three 
experimental scenarios but self reported effort in playing the game in both E1 and 
E2 are statistically significantly greater than for E0.  The t – test results found that for 
E1>E0, t = -2.411, p= 0.021 and E2>E0, t = -2.208, P = 0.034.  Page‟s L test was 
run on the eight groups (each group was treated as single data point) and found 
that there was a significant level of agreement between the predicted ranking for 
homogenous players (E1>E2>E0) and the experimental ranking (L = 104 α = 0.05, 
one tailed test) for self reported effort in playing the three games.   
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
4.4 Transport outcome results 
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Table 7 shows the summary results for target ambition (set at the start of the 
experiment), target attainment (were the targets met in year five) and absolute 
outcomes (how much was achieved ignoring whether or not the target was met). 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
The first row of Table 7 suggests that for 3 of the 7 indicators the level of target 
ambition followed the expected assumptions for homogenous players that E1 > E2 
> E0 and that this increases to five out of seven indicators if the conditions are 
relaxed to E1 and E2 both being greater than E0 but in any order. This suggests that 
the targets set are more ambitious with some form of incentives in place than 
without. On target attainment it appears that setting more ambitious targets does 
not mean that targets will be achieved with two of the five indicators for which more 
ambitious targets were set in both E1 and E2 not being met (5/7 reducing to 3/7). 
Politically this may be important if ambitious targets cannot be delivered. It is 
however necessary to look at the absolute level of achievement to see if the 
system has delivered its goals of incentivising better performance. In this regard, 3 
of the seven indicators were higher strictly in the order E1 > E2 > E0 and this 
increases to six of the seven indicators if the conditions are relaxed to E1 and E2 
both being greater than E0 but in any order. This implies that although the targets 
might not all be met, the absolute outcomes are better when there is some form of 
incentive than when there is not. It has not been possible to establish statistical 
significance within such a small sample.  
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4.5 Summary of experimental results 
Taking the experiment as a whole, we can conclude that there is statistical support 
for H1 from the t-tests on self-reported effort and the evidence on outcomes 
(although this is lacking in statistical significance). On H2 and H3, there is a more 
mixed picture, including some statistical support for H2 but other evidence pointing 
to either H2 or H3. Although less conclusive, this is at least consistent with the 
theory which suggests mixed homogenous/heterogenous groups would lead to a 
mix of rankings of E1 and E2. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This research set out to determine the likely impacts of a performance reward 
funding regime for local transport planning which is linked to achievement against 
targets. None of the methods adopted alone would have provided a picture 
complete enough for us to draw practical conclusions. Taken together however, 
there are some key themes and conclusions arising. 
 
First, linking performance rewards to target setting will lead to competition between 
authorities and, designed correctly, this will lead to greater levels of achievement 
against the key metrics in the system than if no performance rewards are available. 
The cost-benefit case for performance rewards remains unproven, however. Data 
on the cost of effort to local authorities, the benefits of greater achievement and the 
additional management costs would all be required. 
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Secondly, incentive design needs to take account of ability differences between the 
local authority players. If the players are inherently similar (homogeneous) in 
ability, or if the game can somehow be designed to offset ability differences, then 
the strongest incentives will be provided by offering a small number of prizes or 
even a single prize. By contrast, if there are ability differences that make some 
authorities inherently weaker than others, and if there is nothing that can be done 
about this, then total effort is more likely to be maximised by offering multiple 
prizes.  
 
Thirdly, in the real LTP game (circa 2006-7) we found that the DfT was using 
subjective assessment to compensate for ability differences with apparent success. 
However, there is no guarantee that that approach will be transferable to other 
contexts, it lacks transparency and has a substantial management cost. Splitting 
the contest into several smaller pools of more evenly-matched authorities would 
have only a small negative impact on the incentive to effort although potentially 
inflates the risk of collusion.    
 
Fourthly, our findings suggest that the effort spent in establishing a level playing 
field was, to some extent, wasted by offering a large number of prizes. This may be 
motivated by a political sensitivity where it is more attractive to spread the prize 
fund widely to avoid being seen to penalise a large number of localities. There are 
lessons to be drawn on running competitions for clearly defined funding pots (e.g. 
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to tackle urban congestion). Here, only those self-selecting authorities that believe 
they have a good chance of winning will compete. Smaller numbers of prizes are 
likely to be more appropriate and politically acceptable in such situations. 
 
Finally, the new approach to target setting appears to have had the desired effect 
of focusing local authority transport planning departments on the quality of their 
planning. Whilst this is welcome and acknowledged, there is still a huge tension 
between their support for the five year planning process and the feeling that too 
much is required of local authorities by central government.  
 
This study has provided some empirical evidence on the potential impacts of 
targets and performance rewards on transport outcomes and on the behaviour of 
participants under any such regime. Targets and performance rewards are 
becoming more widespread globally throughout public services. Whether they will 
prove to be a good thing for transport remains to be seen. Whilst the system 
appears to offer benefits of enhanced performance on defined indicators this may 
lead to imbalances in priorities between those things for which performance is 
rewarded and those for which it is not.  
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Table 1: Mandatory and Best Value Performance Indicators 
Mandatory LTP Indicators Mandatory Best Value Performance 
Indicators 
LTP1: Accessibility target BVPI 223: Principal road condition* 
LTP2: Change in area wide road 
traffic mileage 
BVPI 224: Unclassified road 
condition* 
LTP3: Cycling trips BVPI 99x: Total killed and seriously 
injured casualties (KSI)* 
LTP5: Bus punctuality indicator* BVPI 99y: Child killed and seriously 
injured casualties * 
LTP6: Changes in peak period traffic 
flows to urban centres^* 
BVPI  99z: Total slight casualties* 
LTP7: Congestion^ BVPI 102:  Public transport 
patronage* 
LTP8: An air quality target^ BVPI 104:  Bus satisfaction* 
 BVPI 187:  Footway condition* 
Key   ^only a requirement for certain authorities 
  *Indicators where stretching/ satisfactory thresholds were set. 
Source: DfT(2004) 
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Table 2: Risk Assessment by target classification (satisfactory, stretching) 
Indicator 
Mean % chance of meeting target 
All Targets Satisfactory 
Targets 
Stretching 
Targets 
Killed and Seriously Injured 79.2 80.4 78.2 
Child KSI 75.8 76.2 74.6 
Slight accident rate 76.3 73.9 78.4 
Bus Satisfaction 72.6 71.9 77.5 
Bus Patronage 72.2 63.0 76.8 
Bus Punctuality 70.2 68.3 71.7 
Unclassified Road Condition 74.1 72.3 79.3 
Footway condition 74.1 69.3 80.0 
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Table 3: Settlement adjustments for best and worst performing authorities 
2006/07 
Authority Population Nature Adjustment Initial 
Allocation 
(£M) 
Cash 
Adjustment 
(£M) 
Cornwall 501267 Rural +25 8.53 +2.13 
Reading 143124 Urban +25 4.86 +1.21 
Halton 119500 Urban +25 1.69 +0.42 
Derby 233700 Urban +25 0.52 +0.13 
Nottingham & 
Nottinghamshire 
1055500 Mix +25 10.48 +2.62 
Cambridgeshire 597400 Mix +17.5 7.37 +1.29 
Norfolk 840700 Rural +17.5 9.42 +1.65 
Leicester 279000 Urban +17.5 5.91 +1.04 
Shropshire 289300 Rural +17.5 3.81 +0.67 
East Riding of York 314113 Rural +17.5 2.81 +0.49 
North East 
Lincolnshire 
157983 Rural -12.5 2.50 -0.31 
Windsor and 
Maidenhead 
141000 Mix -12.5 1.55 -0.19 
Milton Keynes 184506 Urban -12.5 1.80 -0.22 
Luton 184000 Urban -12.5 2.87 -0.36 
 36 
Table 4: Effort Measures 
Process oriented effort measure Outcome oriented effort measure 
Measure Description Measure Description 
Level of stretch set The ambition of 
the targets set 
Indicator levels vs. 
stretch set 
The extent to 
which targets are 
met 
Planning time 
invested 
The amount of 
time invested in 
deciding what to 
set 
Indicator levels vs. 
no incentive 
scenario 
The change over a 
system with 
targets but no 
incentive 
Number of 
scenarios run 
The number of 
times participants 
tried different 
strategies each 
year 
  
Self reported input 
effort 
The reported effort 
on the task 
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Table 5: End of experiment questionnaire results 
Statement                               
1 = Disagree to 5 = Agree 
Mean σ 
Setting ambitious targets led to greater rewards 3.7 1.1 
Setting ambitious targets was more risky 3.6 1.0 
I understood how the assessments were made each year 4.0 1.1 
Performance rewards helped me to achieve more 3.5 0.9 
Performance penalties stopped me achieving my goals 2.8 1.1 
I was penalised if I did not achieve the targets I set 2.5 1.0 
I tried hard harder at the start of each five years than the end 2.5 1.3 
I changed my strategy a lot for each experiment 2.8 1.2 
The strategies I developed would be acceptable to the public 2.8 1.2 
I competed against the other players 3.6 1.2 
I found the PLUTO model difficult to use 1.6 0.7 
The players in my group were of an equal ability 3.0 1.1 
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Table 6:  Average Self Reported Effort in Setting Targets and Playing the 
Game6 (effort score range = 0..100) 
 Experimental Scenario 
E0 E1 E2 
Target Setting Effort 37.52 39.33 37.48 
Experiment Effort 34.00 40.12 39.34 
 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Self reported effort is calculated using the NASA TLX scales  
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Table 7: Targets and Outcome Results 
  Number of Indicators 
E1 > E2 > E0 
Number of Indicators 
(E1 AND E2) > E0 
Target Ambition 3/7 5/7 
Target Attainment 1/7 3/7 
Actual Attainment 3/7 6/7 
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Figure 1: Average Scores for each target for the three assessments 
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Figure 2: Effort responses in the 82 player game 
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Figure 3: Time spent setting targets for the three experiments 
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Figure 4: Target setting and performance scores over the 5 years for the five 
individuals in groups X and Y for experimental condition E2 
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